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Abstract
We aim to shed light on the debate among policy-makers trying to find pre-
scriptions that will take troubled economies out of their debt trap. We do this
with a highly stylized two-compartment dynamic model consisting of the stocks of
money in Government and Society. The dynamics of the system are described by
a simple four-parameter linear system of two differential equations. The solutions
are investigated in closed form and provide precisely quantified ”escape conditions”
from the debt trap: receipts must be slightly larger than outlays and there must be
sufficient annual inflows of funds into the system. The model fits the data for the
U.S. between 1981 and 2012 with a coefficient of correlation of 0.996. The model is
used to extrapolate the two stocks beyond 2012 with three escape scenarios which
shed light on monetary flows needed to take the U.S. economy out of its debt trap.
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1 Introduction
Until a few years ago, mainstream economists were convinced that they had finally un-
derstood the origins of big recessions like the one started in 1929. Above all they knew
how to prevent them.1 They use sophisticated instruments like Discrete Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) models to inform macro-economic debates. These models have
been criticized by some (Solow (2010); Kocherlakota (2010)) but are still used by Central
Banks and the European Union among others (see Ratto et al. (2009) and Annicchiarico
et al. (2013) for a recent application to Italy).
Inspired by these models Ben Bernanke expressed in 2004 his optimism that the Great
Moderation (a reduction of the volatility of business cycles) would continue2. Today, in
the midst of the worst and still ongoing economic crisis since 1929 such a belief sounds
naive. The same Bernanke, at a conference organized at Princeton University in 2010
admitted that ”economists failed to predict the nature, timing, or severity of the crisis”.
He added that ”some observers have suggested the need for an overhaul of economics as
a discipline, arguing that much of the research in macroeconomics and finance in recent
decades has been of little value or even counter-productive” (Bernanke, 2010).
The reasons behind the failure of many beautiful and mathematically rigorous eco-
nomic theories are the object of heated debates. Some suggested replacing the old models
with better empirically-based ones. (Colander et al. (2008); Quiggin (2010) and others).
Even before the crisis, Paul Krugman was sceptical of DSGE models. In his seminal
paper Krugman (2000) suggested we not discard too easily old-fashioned ad hoc models
like the Hicksian IS-LM model. These two proposals exemplify the criticism to the micro-
foundation of the macro-economic models developed by many influential economists. In-
deed, these macro models are essentially based on the aggregation of identical hyper-
rational agents (the so-called representative agent hypothesis). Colander et al. (2008)
point out that these models ignore heterogeneity among agents, who are at best bound-
1In 2003, one of the most important and influential economists, the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas,
in his Presidential Address at the 115th meeting of the American Economic Association said that the
”central problem of depression prevention has been solved”.
2Meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, 20 April 2004.
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edly rational. As a result they suggest using agent-based models which capture individual
heterogeneities more realistically.
Krugman argues that simple non-micro-founded models like IS-LM or AD-AS models
have a role to play, next to ”the bigger, more micro-founded models [which] have not lived
up to their promises”. More generally he adds that small ad-hoc models are useful and
that ”we need to keep them alive”.
The model we propose in this paper follows Krugman’s suggestion. Unlike DGSE
models which rely on dozens of parameters ours is a highly stylized dynamical systems
model that attempts to capture with only four parameters the flow of funds between the
government and society.
We thus hope to make an objective and dispassionate contribution to the vital debate
among economists trying to find policies that will get economies out of their debt trap.
This debate rages both in Europe and in the U.S. Indeed, since the beginning of the current
crisis the European Commission has urged Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain to increase
taxes and reduce public expenditures. Many economists feel that debt-reduction is indeed
the first priority and support this approach, both in Europe and the U.S. For example
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) warn against a debt above 90% of GDP - a finding put into
question by Herndon et al. (2013) who have pointed out problems with the methodology
used. Others, led by Krugman urge caution and warn that austerity can lead to doubts
about government solvency (see Krugman (2012) and other articles on Krugman’s blog).
They also fear the long-term impact of reduced growth associated with austerity measures
and advocate stimulus spending instead of austerity. One can see both sides: pro-austerity
economists emphasize the need to stabilize public finances while pro-stimulus ones fear
that austerity can be a vicious circle that keeps an economy permanently in its debt trap.
This trap is not unlike the Malthusian one faced by European economies for millennia
up to the Industrial Revolution (Komlos and Artzrouni, 1990). Until then the Malthusian
trap kept human populations at or below their subsistence level while a homeostatic
mechanism insured that a period of crisis was always followed by a recovery. Similarly,
the current debt trap keeps the government in debt - but sadly with no homeostasis in
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sight. For both traps the challenge is to describe the nature of the trap and the way out.
Our model consists of two compartments, Government and Society, with monetary
flows between the compartments and the outside world (see Tramontana (2010) for a
detailed discussion of the compartmental approach in economics and an application to
macroeconomics). Many simplifying assumptions are made. The roles of inflation, GDP,
financial markets and wealth distribution among others are ignored. The role of popula-
tions is ignored too - or rather it is implicitly assumed to grow with society’s stock which
we will see is monotonically increasing. The model is also time-invariant: parameters are
fixed, although they can change at one point in time as will happen in our numerical
illustration.
Despite its extreme simplifications, we will see that the model captures well the evo-
lution of the stocks of money in the two compartments for the U.S. between 1981 and
2012. A simple mathematical analysis of the escape conditions is used to shed light on
the conditions required for the U.S. to escape its debt trap.
In Section 2 we describe the model and provide simple closed-form expressions for the
two stocks. Section 3 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the escape condition, i.e. the
conditions on the four parameters under which the government’s stock grows unhindered.
Section 4 is devoted to an application to the U.S. federal debt. Three escape scenarios
are given. In Section 5 we discuss the significance of the results in the context of the
stimulus-austerity debate. We conclude in Section 6 with possible extensions.
2 The model
2.1 Description
We will use a simple dynamical system to describe our two-sector economy consisting
of a Government (”G”) and Society (”S”). The model is compartmental in the sense
that both the G and S sectors are characterized at every instant t by their total stocks
of money G(t) and S(t) (Figure 1). The model is a purely financial one with monetary
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flows between the two compartments and the outside world. When a stock is positive
it increases with interest rate ι (inflow). Society’s stock will always be positive, but the
government’s stock can be negative (”debt”). In this case the interest paid ιG(t) is an
outflow. The G sector spends money (public expenditures or ”outlays”) in the S sector
and also draws from the S sector the revenues (tax revenues or ”receipts”) needed to
provide vital services (infrastructure, civil servants, etc.). The S sector incorporates all
forms of economic activity (manufacturing, services, etc.). For example in the U.S. the G
compartment might be the federal government characterized by a stock called the public
debt when it is negative. Society’s stock might be the M2 or M3 money supply - although
this supply must exclude funds held by banks.
Government 
G(t) 
Society  
S(t)>0 
 s S(t) 
 i G(t) 
 i S(t)  aG  aS 
Central  and 
other banks 
Figure 1: Government and Society compartments with a transfer σS(t) between the two.
The direction of the flow is determined by the sign of σ. The annual flows αG and
αS between the two compartments and the outside world are positive or negative. The
interest rate ι is positive with interests ιS(t) flowing into S because society’s stock is
always positive. The government pays an interest ιG(t) when it is in debt (G(t) < 0) and
receives ιG(t) when its stock is positive (G(t) < 0).
The model is in continuous time and we will describe the temporal dynamics of
(G(t), S(t)) with a system of two linear differential equations. There are two compo-
nents to each one of the derivatives dG/dt and dS/dt. The first one is ιG(t) and ιS(t),
respectively, where ι > 0 is an ”intrinsic interest rate”: the stocks increase per year by
the quantities ιG(t) and ιS(t) that are received or paid out depending on the sign of G(t)
and S(t). When G(t) is negative then ιG(t) is negative and is an interest paid. With S(t)
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being positive the S compartment earns an interest ιS(t) per unit of time. A simplifica-
tion of the model is that the lending and borrowing are thus at the same unchanging rate
ι. These flows link the G and S compartments to an outside world of banks and other
financial institutions that lend, borrow and print money. (For this reason these financial
institutions must not be included in the S sector).
The second components of the flows dG/dt and dS/dt are the affine functions αG +
σS(t) and αS − σS(t) of S(t). The system is, with explanations below:
dG
dt
= ιG+ αG + σS (1)
dS
dt
= ιS + αS − σS. (2)
The two affine functions capture crudely but with some flexibility the transfers of
money between the two compartments and the outside world. The quantity σS(t) is a
net annual flow from S into G. This flow captures the net effect of receipts (e.g. taxes
which are related to GDP) and of outlays (e.g. schools, civil servants which are related to
the size of the population). These receipts and outlays are intrinsically proportional to the
size of the economy/population crudely measured by society’s stock S(t). The coefficient
of proportionality σ (or ”transfer rate”) is positive when receipts exceed outlays and
negative otherwise (always assuming S(t) remains positive).
The constant annual flows αG and αS are also of arbitrary sign. They can reflect
exchanges of money with the outside world or with central banks (foreign trade or invest-
ments, money printing, etc.) They can also reflect a net balance of constant annual flows
between the two compartments (unlike the flow σS(t) which is proportional to S(t)).
Fiscal and monetary policies are tuned through the signs and sizes of σ and the α’s.
Fiscal policies can change the sign and magnitude of σ. Monetary policies can determine
the α’s. For example the government (or the Central Bank) can on an annual basis print
the same amount of money, buy bonds, or engage in various others forms of quantitative
easing. For example the government may annually give itself 0.2 units of free money and
stimulate the economy by spending 0.3 on public works in S. Its annual debt increases by
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0.1 (αG = −0.1) while society’s stock increases by 0.3 (αS = 0.3).
Alternatively the government may want to spend the same 0.3 on public works by
borrowing the entire amount, not printing money. This increases the government debt
by αG = −0.3 with the same result as above for S (αS = 0.3). In this case the sum
αG + αS is zero and Eqs. (1)-(2) show that the sum of derivatives
dG
dt
+
dS
dt
is equal to
ι(G+ S). Because G(0) + S(0) can be negative we conclude that when αG +αS = 0 then
the absolute value of the sum G(t) + S(t) of the stocks increases at the interest rate ι.
The long-term consequences of these various strategies are uncertain. However things
will become clearer once we obtain and analyze the solutions to the system of differential
equations (1)-(2).
2.2 Solution
The linear system (1)-(2) is simple particularly as (2) is a differential equation in S alone.
The solution is
G(t) =
(
G(0) + S(0) +
αG + αS
ι
)
eιt−
(
S(0) +
αS
ι− σ
)
e(ι−σ)t +
σ(αG + αS)− ιαG
ι(ι− σ) (3)
S(t) =
(
S(0) +
αS
ι− σ
)
e(ι−σ)t− αS
ι− σ . (4)
We note that the sum of the two stocks is
G(t) + S(t) =
(
G(0) + S(0) +
αG + αS
ι
)
eιt−αG + αS
ι
. (5)
This shows that up to the additive constant −(αG + αS)/ι the absolute value of the
sum of the stocks will grow exponentially at rate ι. The sign of the sum, asymptotically,
is that of the coefficient of eιt in Eq. (5).
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3 Escape analysis
3.1 Escape conditions
We will say that the economy escapes the debt trap if in the long-run both G(t) and
S(t) remain positive. Equations (3)-(4) show that this can only happen with G(t) and
S(t) asymptotically exponential with rates ι > 0 and ι − σ > 0 respectively. (G(t) ∼ eιt
and S(t) ∼ e(ι−σ)t). Equation (4) shows that both S(0) + αS/(ι − σ) and ι − σ must be
positive in order to have S(t) ∼ e(ι−σ)t. Equation (3) shows that G(0) + S(0) + αG + αS
ι
must be positive and σ smaller than ι in order to have G(t) ∼ eιt. In short the economy
escapes the debt trap with G(t) ∼ eιt and S(t) ∼ e(ι−σ)t if and only if the following three
conditions are satisfied:
C1. G(0) + S(0) +
αG + αS
ι
> 0.
C2. 0 < σ < ι.
C3. S(0) > −αS/(ι− σ).
Under conditions C1-C3 we have S(t) ∼ e(ι−σ)t and S(t) increases monotonically from
time t = 0. On the other hand G(t) ∼ eιt either after an initial decrease (”eventual
escape”) or like S(t) with a monotone increase from t = 0 (”immediate escape”). The
escape is eventual (or immediate) if the initial value dG(0)/dt of the derivative of G(t) is
negative (or positive). Equation (1) provides the expression for the derivative and shows
that the condition
C4. ιG(0) + αG + σS(0) > 0
insures an immediate escape and also implies C1 when combined with C2-C3.
3.2 Escape locus in (αG + ιG(0), σS(0)) space
The model (and escape conditions) depend on four parameters (ι, σ, αG, αS) and on the
initial values G(0), S(0) of the stocks. We will formulate the escape conditions C1-C4 in
the 2D space (λ, ζ) defined by
λ
def.
= αG + ιG(0), ζ
def.
= σS(0). (6)
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In this space we define the vertical and horizontal lines
λ0
def.
= −αS − ιS(0), ζ0 def.= α−S + ιS(0), (7)
where x− denotes min(x, 0) for any real x.3
The escape conditions C1-C4 translate into the four regions Rk (k=1,2,3,4) of the space
(λ, ζ) corresponding to the different asymptotic behaviours of the stocks (see Figure 2 and
its caption for details). Conditions C2 and C3 are equivalent to ζ between 0 and ζ0 which
must be positive (λ0 is then negative). The condition C4 is equivalent to (λ, ζ) on the
right of the diagonal ζ = −λ. The condition C1 is equivalent to λ > λ0.
The fact that ζ = σS(0) must be between 0 and ζ0 means that for an escape σ must be
positive but not too large. If ζ and therefore σ are negative the excessive G to S transfer
means either one of the two stocks goes to −∞ while the other one grows. If ζ is larger
than ζ0 (i.e. σ > ι at least when αS > 0) then the government receipts are so high that
S(t)→ −∞. (However S(t)→ −∞ is not an economically realistic scenario).
The interesting case arises when ζ is between 0 and ζ0. Society’s stock in this case
always goes to +∞. The behaviour of the government stock depends on λ = αG + ιG(0).
If λ is too far on the left (Region R1) this means the flow αG into G or the initial G(0)
are too negative. If λ is in the middle region R2 then an escape occurs after an initial
period of decrease for G(t). The closer λ is to the border value λ0 between R1 and R2
the more protracted the period of decrease. An immediate escape takes place for (λ, ζ)
in R3; λ can still be negative but ζ must be larger than −λ. When λ becomes positive,
then an immediate escape takes place for any ζ in (0, ζ0).
3.3 Escape conditions
In the numerical application below we will fit the model to U.S. data on total debt and
the M2 money stock. We will obtain baseline (fitted) values of the parameters that not
surprisingly place the country in a debt trap. The situation is of course not sustainable
3The sum λ0 + ζ0 is non-positive because it is equal to 0 when αS ≤ 0 and to −αS otherwise.
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in the long run. We are thus interested in exploring which perturbation of the baseline
parameters might bring the system into an escape region. For example one could find
the set of parameter values in the escape region that is closest to the baseline values. A
simpler prescription is possible when the baseline parameter values put the system in R1
of Figure 2. With a superscript ”b” referring to baseline values one can then increase the
sum αbG + α
b
S in a way that brings the point (λ
b, ζb) into R2. Indeed increasing α
b
G moves
(λb, ζb) horizontally to the right toward and beyond the vertical line at λ0. Increasing
αbS moves that vertical line to the left and (λ
b, ζb) can find itself in R2. We call this a
”
∑
α-increase prescription” in Figure 2.
Other possibilities include ”zero-sum prescriptions” that only change the flow of money
between the two compartments without any appeal to external funds. There are two ways
of achieving this. One is to modify σ which only changes the flow σS(t) between the two
compartments (”σ-zero-sum prescription”). Figure 2 shows that for a sufficiently large
increase in σ such a prescription can move to R2 or R3 a (λ
b, ζb) in R5 for which λ
b is
larger than λ0 but still negative.
Alternatively, we can shift constant amounts annually from one compartment to the
other. We do this by adding a quantity δ to the baseline αbG and subtracting the same δ
from the baseline αbS. We obtain a zero-sum perturbation of the flows which we labelled
as a ”α-zero-sum prescription” in Figure 2. The modified constant flows are of the form
α′G = α
b
G + δ, α
′
S = α
b
S − δ (8)
where δ can be either positive or negative. The parameter ζb remains unchanged while λ
is increased by δ to become
λ
′
= λb + δ. (9)
The vertical and horizontal lines at λ0 and ζ0 become
λ
′
0 = −αbS + δ − ιS(0), ζ
′
0 = (α
b
S − δ)− + ιS(0). (10)
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These equations show that any positive or negative δ moves a (λb, ζb) in R1 horizontally
while the border between R1 and R2 (i.e. the vertical line at λ
′
0) also moves in the
same direction at the same rate. This means that even with a positive δ an α-zero-sum
prescription cannot move (λb, ζb) from R1 to R2. Starting from R1 an increase in σ is of
no help either as it would just move (λb, ζb) = (λb, σbS(0)) vertically upward and into R4.
We recall that a baseline (λb, ζb) in R2 means an escape after a initial period of decline
for G(t). We ask whether an α-zero-sum prescription with a positive δ could move a
(λb, ζb) from R2 into R3 thus insuring a quicker escape. The perturbed λ
′
moves to the
right while the vertical border value λ
′
0 also moves to the right at the same rate. Therefore
the perturbed (λ
′
, ζb) cannot fall back into R1. However as we let δ grow there is now a
race between the rightward shift of (λ
′
, ζb) that we are trying to bring to the (unchanging)
diagonal and the downward move of the perturbed horizontal line at ζ
′
0. When α
b
S < 0
then the escape region R2 is reduced to a triangular area in which (λ
b, ζb) in R2 is closer
to the diagonal then to the baseline ζb0 = ι
bS(0). The perturbed (λ
′
= λb + δ, ζb) wins the
race because it reaches the diagonal for
δ = −λb − ζb > 0 (11)
before ζ
′
0 reaches ζ
b.
A positive αbS means the existence of a rectangular area in R2, as in Figure 2. In this
case (λ
′
, ζb) can also be brought into R3 because ζ
′
0 starts decreasing only when δ reaches
αbS.
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(𝑮 ∪, 𝑺 ↑) 
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-aS -iS(0) ≝   l0          
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a - zero-sum  
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No escape  (R5): 𝑮 ↓, 𝑺 ↑  𝐨𝐫 𝑮 ↑, 𝑺 ↓  
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𝒅𝒕
= aG + iG + sS 
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aS 
+  is max(aS ,0); aS 
-  is min(aS ,0) 
aS
 + 
s-zero-sum  
prescription 
Sa- incr.  
prescription 
Figure 2: Locus of escape conditions in the (λ, ζ) space. The system can escape the debt
trap only if (λ, ζ) is between the horizontal lines ζ = 0 and ζ = ζ0. The three regions R1,
R2 and R3 are between these two lines. To be in R1 a point must also be on the left of
the vertical line at λ = λ0. To be in R2 it must be below the diagonal ζ = −λ and to the
right of the vertical line at λ = λ0. To be in R3 it must be above that diagonal - while
always remaining between the two horizontal lines. If λ = αG + ιG(0) is too negative
(in region R1) there is no escape. For the intermediate region R2 the escape will occur
eventually, after an initial decrease in G(t). For λ large enough (R3) there is an immediate
escape. (A variable name G or S followed by an up arrow ↑ (or down arrow ↓) means
the variable goes to plus (or minus) infinity exponentially fast; ”G ∪” means G(t) first
decreases before growing exponentially.)
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Figure 3: Fitted and actual trajectories of public debt G (left axis) and M2 money supply
S (right axis) in the U.S., 1981-2012, trillions of USD (coefficient of correlation r = 0.996).
4 Application
4.1 Model fitting to U.S. data
We illustrate the model with data on the U.S. federal budget (G(t)) which is readily
available. We recognize that this is gross simplification, mostly because we thus ignore
the role of states which provide many services. For this reason we consider that the exercise
is for illustrative purposes only. Society’s stock is an even bigger challenge. Indeed, the
money supplies M1-M3 come to mind but we are unsure which one is the most relevant;
M1 or M3 may be too narrowly or broadly defined. In the U.S. no data on the M3 money
supply is available after 1986. For these reasons we chose M2.
If society’s real stock is quite different from M2 and/or immeasurable this complicates
the use of the model, although all is not necessarily lost. Indeed suppose a ”real” stock
S were an affine but unknown function of the M2 stock: S = ρ0 + ρ1M2. Substituting
this expression for S in Eqs. (1)-(2) yields a model in (G(t),M2(t)) that is structurally
the same as before with M2(t) as a proxy stock for society. Indeed σ becomes ρ1σ; αG
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becomes αG + ρ0σ and αS becomes αS − ρ0σ. The unknown ρ’s have been folded into the
model’s unknown parameters.
We used data from 1981, the earliest year available for the readily downloadable data
on M2 from the Federal Reserve.4 The last data point was for 2012 (n = 32). We fixed
the initial values of the stocks G(0) and S(0) at their 1981 values. We then attempted to
estimate the four parameters αG, αS, ι, and σ by minimizing the sum of the 64 squared
deviations consisting of the 32 deviations between observed and fitted government stocks
plus the 32 deviations between observed and fitted stocks for society. Because the model
is non-linear we used standard numerical methods to find the minimum. However the
algorithm converged to a different solution for each initial value of the four parameters - a
most undesirable situation. The model is not strictly speaking over-parametrized: there
are no two different sets of parameters that yield mathematically the same trajectories of
Eqs. (3) - (4). However this ”near-over-parametrization” arose because different sets of
parameters produced fitted trajectories that were extremely close to one other during the
period 1981-2012 - even though they diverged later on.
Because we have information on interest rates we decided to address this problem by
fixing ι. We recall however that in our model this interest rate is assumed to be equal
for government borrowing and for investors in society and also unchanging through time
- two gross simplification. Still, to assess what this interest might be we looked at the
series of ”Interest Expense on National Debt”. Dividing these amounts by the national
debt provided perhaps naive estimates of the interest rate paid by the government. This
interest rate declined from roughly 7 to 4 % during the 32 years between 1981 and 2012.
We thus chose to estimate ι as the average value during that period which is ι̂ = 5.875%.
With ι now fixed we define the vector θ of the three remaining parameters
θ = (αG, αS, σ). (12)
4Federal Reserve Economic Data; https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Parameters Value
Primary parameters and r
α̂G -0.07447
α̂S -0.02359
σ̂ -0.00561
Coeff. corr. r 0.996
Derived parameters
ζ̂0 = α̂S
− + ι̂S(0) 0.007503
λ̂0 = −α̂S − ι̂S(0) -0.007503
ζ̂ = σ̂S(0) -0.00942
λ̂ = α̂G + ι̂G(0) -0.13267
Table 1: Primary parameter estimates, coefficient of correlation and derived parameters
in fitting of U.S. data (1981-2012).
These parameters were estimated by minimizing over θ the sum of squared deviations
SS1(θ) =
∑
k
(G(k)actual −G(k, θ))2 +
∑
k
(S(k)actual − S(k, θ))2 (13)
where G(k, θ) and S(k, θ) are for the year k the modelled values given in Eqs. (3)-(4).
The initial values of the stocks are the debt and M2 money supply on 1/1/1981:
G(0) = −0.991;S(0) = 1.679 (in trillions of USD). The search procedure converged
nicely to the same estimated value θ̂ = (α̂G, α̂S, σ̂) for any reasonable initial values of the
parameters. These three ”primary parameter” estimates as well as the derived ones are
given in Table 1.5
The solutions in Eqs. (3)-(4) are now
G(t) = −1.31213 e0.06437t−0.98105 e0.05875t +1.3026 (14)
S(t) = 1.31213 e0.06437t +0.36657 (15)
with t = 0 corresponding to Jan 1, 1981 (Figure 3). With a coefficient of correlation of
0.996 the model is able to describe with four parameters (one of which was fixed) the
5Ours is not an econometric model and we do not attempt to derive confidence interval for the
parameters - which we estimate just for illustrative purposes.
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dynamics of the U.S. debt and of the M2 stock of money over 32 years.
There are several ways in which an economy can be caught in a debt trap. The value
of ζ0 which defines the horizontal border between R1 − R3 and R4 could be negative; λ0
could be positive. Even if ζ0 and λ0 are of the right sign, λ could be smaller than λ0,
thus putting the system in the trap region R1. Here the U.S. is in a debt trap because
the estimated σ is negative: modelled outlays are larger than receipts - as is the case with
actual values.
4.2 Conditions toward an escape from the U.S. debt trap
In order to investigate scenarios (i.e. parameter values) under which the U.S. may escape
its current debt trap we will run the model from Jan. 1, 2012 with initial values of the
two stocks equal to the actual ones on that date: G(0) = −15.984 and S(0) = 10.003
(these are relatively close to the ”endpoint” modelled values obtained from Eqs.(14)-(15)
with t = 31 i.e., -14.410 and 10.017). Our goal is to use the insights gained above to find
the minimum modifications of the estimated parameter values for which the economy can
escape the debt trap.
With a falling trend for interest rates during 1981-2012 we will run the model from 2012
using as a baseline interest ιb the rate defined like above as the ratio of interest payment
to debt on Dec 31, 2011 (last reliable value available): ιb = 454/15223 = 0.02982.
Because the system cannot escape with a negative σ we set σb = 0. This means
ζb = σS(0) = 0. We take as baseline α’s the values obtained above:
αbG = α̂G = −0.07447, αbS = α̂S = −0.02359. (16)
We then have
λb0 = −αbS − ιbS(0) = −0.27473, (17)
λb = αbG + ι
bG(0) = −0.55117 (18)
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Parameter Parameter values for three scenarios
Flat G Immediate escape Eventual escape
αG α
′
G = 0.4767 α
′
G = 0.4767 0.7α
′
G = 0.33369
αS -0.02359 -0.02359 -0.02359
σ 0 0.01 0.01
ι 0.02982 0.02982 0.02982
Table 2: Primary parameters chosen for three projection scenarios of S and G stock in
the U.S., beyond 2012.
and ζb0 = −λb0 = 0.27473 because αS < 0.
The fact that λb < λb0 means the system is in Region R1 on the border with R5 (because
ζb = σbS(0) = 0.) Therefore the system is still in a debt trap. Bringing the system out of
the trap with a minimum change in parameters requires a λb at least equal to the border
value λb0 = −0.27473. As already discussed this can mean a very slow escape preceded by
a protracted decline of G(t). To attain an immediate escape we need to move (λb, ζb = 0)
to (0, 0), the closest border point between R2 and R3. Equation (18) shows that a zero
λb means that αbG must become
α
′
G = −ιbG(0) = 0.4767. (19)
This last equation combined with σ = 0 means that G(t) of Eq. (3) is constant. We will
call this scenario ”Flat G” meaning an unchanging government stock. With αG = α
′
G
there will be an immediate escape if σ becomes infinitesimally larger than 0 since ζb
becomes positive and (λb = 0, ζb > 0) is then inside R3 (”Immediate escape” scenario,
below with σ = 0.01). If, for illustrative purposes, α
′
G of Eq. (19) is reduced to 70% of
its value (i.e. to 0.70α
′
G = 0.33369) then (λ
b, ζb > 0) falls back into R2 and we have an
”Eventual escape” scenario. The parameter values corresponding to these three projection
scenarios are brought together in Table 2. Extrapolated values of the stocks are plotted
in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Fitted (until 2012) and extrapolated G stock (left axis) and S stock (right
axis), U.S., 1981-2012, trillions of USD. There are three extrapolation scenarios. ”Flat
G” corresponds to the minimum αG = 0.47670 government annual inflow above which an
immediate escape will occur (with σ = 0). The ”Immediate escape” scenario corresponds
to the same αG but with σ = 0.01. (The system is in Region R3 of Figure 2). The
”Eventual escape” scenario corresponds to an αG reduced to 70% of its initial value
(αG = 0.3337) which puts the system back in Region R2. The extrapolated stock S is the
same for the third and second scenario because S does not depend on αG.
In summary, the model suggests that the U.S. could start pulling itself out of its trap
with a balance between outlays and receipts (σ = 0) combined with an infusion of funds
at least equal to 0.47670 trillion USD a year. The timing of events can be read off Figure
4. A transfer rate σ of just 0.01 means an immediate escape with a stock G reaching 0
after 50 years around 2060. With an annual infusion of 0.33369 instead of 0.47670, the
U.S. government’s stock continues to sink until approximately 2040 and then recovers
ever so slowly.
4.3 Discussion of escape conditions
4.3.1 The U.S.
Escape conditions can go beyond parameter values and affect initial values. Indeed, mir-
roring the way random population crises kept populations of the past in their Malthusian
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trap, a sufficiently large one-off positive deterministic shock on the initial values G(0)
and S(0) can take the government’s budget out of its trap. For example the effect of the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the U.S. could have been captured, however
crudely, by our model. We would have stopped the model in 2008 and restarted it after
increasing initial values of the stocks by a total 0.475 trillion USD, the amount injected in
the economy under TARP. A one-off injection of 0.475 was probably not enough to take
the U.S. economy out of its debt trap - in reality or in our model. The model can then
be used to assess, at least in broad terms, the size and G/S allocation of such a one-off
stimulus that would be sufficient to bring about the escape.
The 0.475 amount is coincidentally very close to the prescribed minimum annual injec-
tion of funds α
′
G = 0.47670 deemed sufficient to halt the drop in G if σ = 0 and to insure
an immediate escape if σ > 0. Despite the purely illustrative nature of the example we
can draw some very tentative conclusions: balanced books and a half-trillion USD annual
inflow into government coffers could take the U.S. out of its debt trap.
4.3.2 Japan
In early 2013 the Bank of Japan announced an aggressive stimulus package in the form of
government bond purchases worth 50 trillion yens per year. This stimulus would typically
be expressed in our model through a 50 trillion yen increase in the sum αG + αG. The
analyst is left with the challenging task of deciding how to allocate this amount between
the two compartments. No doubt there is an optimal such allocation. One issue is the
knock-on effects of such prescriptions, for example on interest rates (our ι) and on inflation
which seems to be a concern in Japan. Although beyond the scope of the present paper
these questions raise the possibility of feedback mechanisms between parameters.
5 Discussion
Despite its extreme simplicity our model shows that an escape from a debt trap rests on
fairly subtle conditions concerning monetary flows between the government and society.
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In summary, two conditions are required for an escape from the debt trap. First there
must be a non-negative flow from society into government that is proportional to soci-
ety’s stock without being too large: the transfer rate σ can be small and must be less
than the interest rate ι. Second, recurrent constant annual expenditures are vital for an
escape. Intriguingly, it is worth noting that regardless of the size of these annual flows,
the asymptotic growth rate of the G and S stocks are always ι and ι − σ : large annual
expenditures do not cause inflation in the long run. We believe that these conditions may
in a general, qualitative sense, apply within more complex models - and perhaps even to
the real world.
Zero-sum perturbations of the sum of α’s which divert funds from one sector to the
other cannot alone take a system out of its debt trap. However in the case of an ”eventual
escape” the model shows than an annual diversion of funds from S to G brings forward
the time at which the government’s stock bottoms out.
We note that an exponential growth of the government’s stock is a mathematical
construct that does not correspond to reality. Once the economy has escaped the debt
trap it is possible for the government to plan the next election and start spending more
in Society - perhaps even making σ at least temporarily negative. The government’s
long-term aim then is to keep its budget at or near an equilibrium.
We emphasize that ours are not policy prescriptions but merely monetary flow pre-
scriptions, which is not the same thing. For example we resist the temptation to translate
an increasing σ into an increased tax rate - because things may not be that simple and
one does not necessarily follow from the other. Complex feedback mechanisms can lead
to counter-intuitive results which can however be fed into the model. For example a
policy-maker may decide that a particular tax decrease will increase economic activity,
growth, and consumer spending - thus enhancing revenues in ways that more than offset
the original tax decrease. He will formulate this policy by increasing σ, not decreasing it.
In short we suggest ”directional flows” of funds leading to an escape, but do not take a
position on how to achieve the result - thus eschewing the austerity-stimulus debate.
Things could be different with an improved version of the model in which the S sector
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has sub-compartments such as households, firms, etc. With a richer model and set of
parameters it may be possible to equate flow prescriptions to austerity/stimulus prescrip-
tions more plausibly than if we are limited to the single parameter σ.
6 Conclusion
The model performed well when applied to illustrative data on the U.S. and initial work
suggests that the same may hold for other countries (France in particular). There are sev-
eral ways however in which the model can be extended. We could add sub-compartments
to one or both of the existing ones. We could endogenize relationships between the pa-
rameters. We could include inflation in the model beyond the parameter ι which already
captures the intrinsic increase in the money stock. We could replace σS(t) with a non-
linear function of S(t). However we then risk losing the benefit of closed form solutions,
which are few and far between when it comes to solving systems of differential equations.
Still, despite its extreme simplicity our model plausibly describes complex macro-economic
realities even if it does not provide definitive answers to the austerity/stimulus debate.
Our model may however point in the direction of sensible solutions to the difficult and
burning problem of preventing the train wreck facing those economies unable to escape
their debt trap.
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